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«Why has the examination of many different aspects of colour been a prominent feature 
in philosophy, to such an extent that the topic is worthy of a handbook?». This is the 
question that opens the editors’ introduction to The Routledge Handbook of Colour. 
This volume is intended not so much as a technical investigation on colour, or at least 
not only as such, but rather as a wider examination of its philosophical value. Colour is 
something «exceedingly familiar» and «seemingly simple», but it is also very «difficult 
to capture in any familiar-sounding, unsophisticated theory», as the many works that 
have been published and still are being published on the topic show. The Handbook 
tries for the first time to give the reader a map of the philosophical researches on colour, 
and to find some common threads among them. 
The contents are divided into six parts: 1. The Importance of Colour to Philosophy, 2. 
The Science and Spaces of Colour 3. Colour Phenomena 4. Colour Ontology 5. Colour 
Experience and Epistemology 6. Language, Categories, and Thought. 
The first part aims to show how colour can contribute to some of the main philosophical 
questions. One of the most important challenges raised by colour is, according to the 
editors, that of building a bridge between our everyday experience of the world and the 
scientific knowledge of it. When we see colours in our everyday life we don’t see 
particles or wavelengths. Nevertheless, modern physics tells us that colours don’t exist 
as we usually see them. Colours are the result of the interaction between our perceptive 
system and the way objects reflect light. As Brian McLaughin notes in the first paper of 
the Handbook, «Current physics doesn’t posit colours, at least as such.  It contains no 
talk of red, green, grey, or the like. Macrophysics posits light dispositions that surfaces 
can possess such as reflectances, spectral reflectances, and triples or integrated 
reflectances.  But in so doing, it doesn’t, thereby, posit colours as such, even if surface 




colours should turn out to be reflectance properties of some sort (a controversial 
matter)».  This was already true for Newton: «the [light] rays, to speak properly, are not 
coloured», he wrote in 1721. «The problem of colour ontology» as Mazviita Chirimuuta 
remarks in her paper «has been diagnosed as a by-product of the modern scientific 
worldview and for this reason the history and philosophy of science are highly relevant 
to the philosophy of colour». Colour, therefore, places us before a fundamental 
«challenge», as the editors write in the Introduction, that of «incorporating phenomenal 
character, or what we acquire via experience, into our understanding of the physical 
world. The challenge is non-trivial». 
Another important question that colour raises has to do with its intrinsically unstable 
and variable character. Colour varies together with the illumination, with the 
backgrounds of objects, and with the observers. Sometimes, even when the conditions 
of observation remain the same, colour is perceived differently by different perceivers. 
One of the clearest cases, from this point of view, is that of «unique hues», examined by 
Mohan Matten in the third part of the volume. If different shades of a colour are shown 
to different subjects, they often give different answers on which one is the unique hue. 
One of the most difficult ones to find an agreement on is unique green.  
How can objects remain the same, then, and their colours vary? This question can raise 
a skeptical concern about our capacity to know the world, as Duncan Pritchard and 
Christopher Ranalli note in their paper. Yet colours have rules, and even very precise 
ones. Some colours are incompatible with some other ones – this is the famous 
Wittgensteinian question of the reddish-green, that Jonathan Westphal and Frederik 
Gierlinger address in their paper –, and colour categories are well defined. However, 
colours also melt into one another, as Diana Raffman states in her paper. They are a 
clear case of vagueness: «Vagueness is often defined in terms of two phenomena: (i) 
soriticality, the property of generating the notorious sorites paradox, about which I will 
say more shortly; and (ii) possession of borderline cases, viz., cases where it is 
supposed to be unclear whether the word applies».  
This elusive character of colour is evident also in depictions. As John Kulvicki shows in 
his article, the colours of a painting do not simply correspond to those of the depicted 
reality. Colour, in both cases, is something that results from different factors: 
illumination, spatial dimension etc. Are perceived colours, then, something merely 




subjective? And if so, what is their relationship to our categories of colour, as Joshua 
Gert asks in his paper? These are only some of the philosophical questions that colour is 
shown to raise in part I of the Handbook. 
The second part of the volume is dedicated to the science of colour. It is an important 
contribution, because it offers an overview of the science of colour as it is understood 
today, accessible also to the non-specialist readers. Alex Byrne and David Hilbert’s 
paper explains the basic notions of colour vision. How do we perceive colour, both from 
an optical and a physiological point of view? Another interesting question is that of 
animal colours, which can be very different from ours. The second text of the section, 
by David Brigg, addresses the different «colour spaces», that is, the geometric 
representations of the relationships between colours. They comprehend the 
Wittgensteinian octahedron, but also the circle and the sphere… One striking aspect is 
certainly the great number of «colour spaces» that have been constructed during the 
centuries. As the editors remark in their Introduction: «one might argue that the mere 
proliferation of colour spaces contains an important lesson about colour. There are 
comparatively few perceptual or psychophysical spaces for other domains such as 
shape, sound, odours, and so on. Our understanding of colour is thus systematizable, but 
there are glaring constraints on how “unified” the resulting understanding is, making 
colour an intriguing topic of study». 
The third part of the volume addresses some questions about colours that  «have been 
puzzling philosophers in recent years (and in many cases for much longer)» 
(Introduction). They include unique hues, to which we referred previously, but also 
“novel colours”, synesthesia and “spectrum inversion”. Novel colours, often also called 
“impossible colours” or “alien colours”, are all colours that humans usually don’t see: 
colours that exceed the usual “colour spaces”. They can result from the union between 
two opposite colours, like Wittgenstein’s famous “greenish red”, or from anomalous 
vision. Some scholars think, for example, that colour-blind people see new colours. In 
her paper on novel colours, Fiona Macpherson examines an experiment that has been 
done by Thomas Crane and Hewitt Piantanida on impossible colours, to which 
Christopher Norris also refers in one of the poems published in this issue. If 
“impossible” colours would show themselves to be possible, what would be the 
consequences for the philosophy of colour?  




The second paper of this part, by B. Brogaard, addresses a question that is also central 
to this issue of “Itinera”, that of synesthesia. In synesthesia «an experience of one thing 
in one sensory or cognitive stream causes a non-veridical experience (or image or 
thought) of another thing in a different sensory or cognitive stream». For example, in 
the cases examined by Brogaard, a certain alphabet letter or sound immediately evoke a 
particular colour. Colours are implied in most synesthetic phenomena. They are colours 
that don’t exist, according to the common vision of the world – and also according to 
the classic physicalist theory of colours, as Brogaard shows. What does this mean for 
the philosophy of colour?  
The question becomes even more difficult if we consider the last colour phenomenon 
examined in this part of the Handbook by Peter Ross, the spectrum inversion. The 
hypothesis of the inverted spectrum is very old and dates back to Locke. Why shouldn’t 
someone call something “red”, but really see it as green? How can I be sure that “my” 
red is also someone else’s red? This calls into question the possibility of colours 
communication, and also that of a common experience of them. As the editors remark in 
the Introduction, «Synaesthesia brings our attention to unexpected associations between 
experiences of colour and other perceptual qualities. Colour blindness highlights the 
potential for colour experiences that cannot be communicated between humans with 
disparate colour visual systems. Spectrum inversion is an extreme case involving both 
unexpected experiential associations and potentially incommunicable experiences». 
The exploration of the borders of our usual colours continues with Keth Allen’s paper 
on animals’ colours and V. Watkins’ text on colour illusion. The last paper of this 
section, by Derek Brown, focuses on colour constancy. Colour constancy is a 
phenomenon of our everyday life. It occurs every time «one sees a thing in one’s 
environment to have a stable colour despite differences in the way it is illuminated at a 
time (simultaneous constancy) or over time (successive constancy)». For example, if we 
look at a white wall that is partially in the shade, we are able to see that the colour of the 
whole wall is one and the same (i.e. white), even if the shaded parts look darker. A 
question, then, arises: «How can something look to be both the same colour and 
differently coloured?» (Introduction). Brown’s answer will involve, as the reader will 
see, both colour’s ontology (what colour really is) and its function (why do we see 
colours?). 




The ontology of colour is the object of the fourth part of the Handbook (with papers by 
A. Byrne, D. Hilbert, J. Gert, J. Cohen, M. E. Kalderon, H. Robinson, W. Wright). It is 
interesting that the editors chose to begin from other questions – primarily the 
importance of colour for philosophy – and address the ontology after. In fact, ontology 
is the main subject on which the Anglo-American debate on colour has focused until 
now. The editors’ idea is that perhaps the discussion should be open to new subjects (as 
Derek Brown wrote in his paper for this issue of “Itinera”). This doesn’t mean that 
ontology should disappear. On the contrary, it is always presupposed in the way these 
other questions are addressed (this is what Derek Brown, in the same paper, calls the 
«metaphilosophical commitments» that have to be discovered within the philosophical 
researches on colour).  
The Handbook offers a new systematization of the different positions regarding the 
ontology of colour. Are colours dependent on the observers, or do they exist 
independently from them? Moreover, can colours be reduced to something else (for 
example physical properties of the objects), or not? The answers to these two questions 
determine the different ontological positions that are examined in this part. Physicalism, 
i.e. the position according to which the ultimate reality of things must be sought in the 
way physics can describe them, has been a dominant position within “analytical” 
philosophy. Yet colour, as noted above, is difficult to describe in purely physicalistic 
terms. Therefore, different positions arose which tried to grasp the phenomenon of 
colour in all its various aspects. 
The fifth part of the volume is dedicated to the question of colour experience (with 
papers by A. Pautz, B. Maund, D. Campbell, W. Breckenridge). As the editors remark 
in the Introduction, it is difficult to talk about colours without paying attention to how 
colours look: to the experience of colours. Yet what is the relationship between our 
experience of the world and the world itself? Is experience a representation of the world 
(representationalist theory)? Or do we directly experience the qualities of objects as 
qualities of our own experience (direct or naive realism)? Yet would it not be possible 
(as indirect realism states) for the contents of experience to exist only in our minds? As 
the editors remark, colour, as «a vivid, familiar phenomenon», is «a fantastic case study 
for theories of perceptual experience». 




The last part of the Handbook addresses the question of the relationship between colour, 
colour language and colour concepts. In fact, the colour spectrum is a continuum. The 
question then is: how do we divide this continuum into different colours? Are the 
divisions something that depends merely on language and culture, or do they also have a 
natural basis? This question gave rise to a long debate, which is the object of Don 
Dedrick’s and R. Briscoe’s papers. It is difficult to draw conclusions on this issue, but it 
seems in any case that the two opposite positions – the culturalistic and the naturalistic 
one – have come closer to one another in recent years. Apparently, some natural and 
physiological constraints are indeed present within the construction of colour categories 
and colour words. Yet these natural factors are intertwined from the outset with a 
variety of cultural, environmental and symbolic factors (and also with beliefs and 
desires, as D. Stokes shows in the last paper). Only the result of this intricate knot is 
what we call “colour”. If a criticism can be raised against this amazing volume, it is that 
perhaps it could devote more space to this encounter between natural and symbolic 
elements within colour. This would mean, perhaps, that it would also pay more attention 
to the variety of artifacts (artistic, but also everyday objects and narrations), in which 
our experience of colour is reflected. There we might see colour emerging from the 
encounter between history and nature; memory and the present. And in light of this 
encounter every usual colour may show itself, in a certain sense, as “novel colour”. 




Table of Contents 
 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Colour Derek H. Brown and Fiona Macpherson 
Part 1: The Importance of Colour to Philosophy 
1. Colour, Colour Experience, and the Mind-Body Problem Brian P. McLaughlin 
2. Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology Duncan Pritchard andChristopher Ranalli 
3. Philosophy of Science Mazviita Chirimuuta 
4. Truth, Vagueness and Semantics Diana Raffman 
5. The Logic of Colour Concepts Frederik Gierlinger and Jonathan Westphal 




6. Colour and the Arts: Chromatic Perspectives John Kulvicki 
7. The Analogy Between Colour and Value Joshua Gert 
Part 2: Interlude: The Science and Spaces of Colour 
8. The Science of Colour and Colour Vision Alex Byrne and David Hilbert 
9. Colour Spaces David Briggs 
Part 3: Colour Phenomena 
10. Unique Hues and Colour Experience Mohan Matthen 
11. Novel Colour Experiences and their Implications Fiona Macpherson 
12. Colour Synaesthesia and Its Philosophical Implications Berit Brogaard 
13. Spectrum Inversion Peter W. Ross 
14. Interspecies Variations Keith Allen 
15. Colour Illusion Michael Watkins 
16. Colour Constancy Derek H. Brown 
Part 4: Colour Ontology 
17. Objectivist Reductionism Alex Byrne and David Hilbert 
18. Primitive Objectivism Joshua Gert 
19. Colour Relationalism Jonathan Cohen 
20. Monism and Pluralism Mark Eli Kalderon 
21. Mentalist Approaches to Colour Howard Robinson 
22. Eliminativism Wayne Wright 
Part 5: Colour Experience and Epistemology 
23. How Does Colour Experience Represent the World? Adam Pautz 
24. Indirect Realism Barry Maund 
25. Does That Which Makes the Sensation Of Blue a Mental Fact Escape Us? John 
Campbell 
26. Colour Experiences and ‘Look’ Sentences Wylie Breckenridge 
Part 6: Language, Categories and Thought 
27. Colour, Colour Language, and Culture Don Dedrick 
28. Colour Categorisation and Categorical Perception Robert Briscoe 
29. Cognitive Penetration and the Perception of Colour Dustin Stokes. 
